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SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. BONDED INDEBTEDNESS
In Theodore v. Blakely' a resident taxpayer brought a class
action to test the constitutionality of a recently passed consti-
tutional amendment 2 allowing the issuance of bonds for hospital
purposes. The question was whether the amendment removed
altogether the debt ceiling for hospitaZ purposes, which would
have the effect of simultaneously raising the ceiling for other
purposes from eight to twenty-five percent, or whether, instead,
the amendment imposed a hospital debt ceiling of twenty-five
percent of taxable property, which would leave the eight percent
for other purposes unchanged?
A unanimous court looked to the wording of the proposal
submitted to the electors.3  "[Ihe language of the question
indicates that the purpose of the amendment was to increase
only the bonded debt limitation applicable to hospital bonds and
to leave the bonded debt limit for other purposes unchanged."4
The court went on to hold that previously issued bonds would be
added to any new issue in arriving at the total debt ceiling,
because the language of the proposal was "to inarease . . . [the]
bonded indebtedness."5
1. 253 S.C. 98, 169 S.E.2d 276 (1969).
2. S.C. CONsT. art X, § 5 was amended to read as follows:
Provided that the limitations as to bonded indebtedness im-
posed by this section shall not apply to bonded indebtedness of
Greenville County for providing hospital facilities and the county
may incur bonded debt to the extent of not exceeding twenty-five
per cent of the assessed value of all taxable property therein. The
bonded indebtedness incurred for the purpose of providing public
hospital facilities shall not be considered in determining the power
to incur indebtedness by any municipality or political subdivision of
the county or State covering or partially extended over any por-
tion of the territory of Greenville County.
3. 253 S.C. at 100, 169 S.E.2d at 277. The proposal submitted to the
qualified electors was:
Shall Section 5 of Article X of the Constitution of the State
be amended so as to permit Greenville County to increase its
bonded indebtedness up to twenty-five per cent of the assessed
value of the taxable property therein for the purpose of providing
public hospital facilities and to exclude such indebtedness from
the limitation of aggregate indebtedness upon any municipality or
political subdivision of the county or State covering or partially
extending over any portion of the territory of Greenville County.
4. 2W3 S.C. at 101, 169 S.E.2d at 278.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
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II. CoNFiC BETWEEN STATUTE AN CONSTITUTION
In Clay v. Thornton the court reiterated the maxim that,
where there is a conflict between the language of the consti-
tution7 and the language of a statute,8 the constitutional language
will prevail. Residents of the area called "North Charleston"
sought to incorporate. Of the 16,900 electors residing and
entitled to vote within the area, only 7,315 cast ballots in the
incorporation election. A majority 'of these voters (4,572 of
7,315) voted in favor of incorporation. The elected "city fathers"
sought to obtain a charter from the Secretary of State. Inter-
ested citizenry objected and obtained a temporary restraining
order. The South Carolina Supreme Court assumed original
jurisdiction because of immediate public interest.
A unanimous court found "the language of Article 8, § 2
plain, and unambiguous. It requires that a majority of the
qualified electors in the area to be incorporated must consent to
incorporation, but leaves open to the Legislature the right to
prescribe how 'such consent' of the designated majority is to be
established." 9 This consent could have been by petition, but
the Legislature chose the election process.
The respondents cited Cass County v. Johnston'° and Paris
Mountain Water Company v. City of GreenviZle l as standing
for the proposition that those who do not vote in an election are
presumed to have assented to the expressed will of the majority.
The Clay court, however, pointed to dictum found with the
holding in the Paris Mountain case:
'We find no provision in the Constitution which
prescribes that a majority of all electors, those voting
6. 253 S.C. 209, 169 S.E2d 617 (1969).
7. S.C. CoNsT. art VII § 2 reads as follows:
ELECTORS MUST dONSENT TO ORGANIZATION. No city or town
shall be organized without the consent of the majority of the
electors residing and entitled by law to vote within the district
proposed to be incorporated; such consent to be ascertained in the
manner and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-353 (1962) reads as follows:
RESULT OF ELECTION AND EFFECT THEREOF .... The [man-
ager's] return shall show the number of those voting in the
election, together with the number of those on each of such ques-
tions. If a majority of those voting in such election shall vote in
favor of such proposed territory being incorporated, then the
Secretary of State shall issue a certificate of incorporation of the
proposed city ...
9. 253 S.C. 209, 214, 169 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1969).
10. 95 U.S. 360 (1877).
11. 110 S.C. 36, 96 SE. 545 (1918).
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and those not voting, shall be necessary to carry an
election by the people save in one instance, and that
refers to an election to determine if a town shall be
incorporated. Article 8, Section 0.,12
Relying on this, the Clay court held that, in all future incor-
poration efforts which involve the election process, the assenting
majority must be a majority of all voting and non-voting quali-
fied electors. In the North Charleston case this number would
have been 8,451 favorable votes.
ITM. CoNs~rr oNA AMENDmINs - Tnmim STATUS
Earlier in this volume of the South Carolina Law Review, a
note surveyed articles I-VII of the proposed draft of the South
Carolina Constitution. s Several joint resolutions by the Legis-
lature will now put some of the surveyed articles before the
voters. The comments found in the previous Note' 4 still apply
to the proposed amendments except as noted below.
The right to indictment will remain the same under the
amendment. The requirement that there be an indictment would
become effective whenever the authorized punishment is two
hundred dollars or imprisonment for thirty days.' 5
A new section is proposed as an amendment to article VII.'8
The proposed amendment would authorize regional councils of
government and would provide financial support therefor. This
proposal could be of great advantage to densely populated areas
where a consolidation of governmental functions would be
beneficial, e.g., Richland and Lexington counties, and Green-
ville and Spartanburg counties.
The proposed amendment to article XV further specifies per-
sons subject to impeachment: "officials elected on a statewide
basis, state judges, and other state officers as may be designated
by law.' 7 Impeachment would be limited to cases of "serious
crimes" or "misconduct in office."' 8
12. 253 S.C. 209, 215, 169 S.E2d 617, 619 (1969) citing Paris Mountain
Water Co. v. City of Greenville, 110 S.C. 36, 53, 96 S.E. 545, 549 (1918)
(emphasis added).
13. See Note, Survey of Articles I-VII of the Proposed Draft for a Revised
South Carolina Constitution, 22 S.C.L. Rav. 50 (1970).
14. Id.
15. Compare Committee to Make a Study of the South Carolina Constitution
of 1895, FiNAL RtPORT, Art. I (1969), with S.C. Coxsr. art I, § 17 and
R1222, H2466, April 21, 1970.
16. R1029, S509, March 31, 1970.
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Under a proposed change to article II there would be sub-
stituted for the present test requiring an ability to read and
write the constitution a "reasonable" English literacy test. Re-
cently literacy tests have been challenged and held void. In
Katzenbaol v. Morgan19 the Voting Rights Act of 196520 was
held to take priority over New York election laws requiring an
ability to read and write English. The act allows one with a
sixth grade education not to be disqualified, if he attends an
American flag school in which the predominant language is
other than English.
On March 24, 1970, the California court in Castro v. State;1
declared its constitutional provision requiring English literacy22
unconstitutional, as it applies to persons literate in another
language in which they could receive political information. The
Morgan and Castro cases should cause the proposed article II,
section 6 to be seriously questioned, for it appears that the pro-
posed provision is no advancement from the present provision.
WmLAm McB. WooD
19. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(e) (1970).
21. 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 466 P.2d 244 (1970). It should be noted that a pro-
posed amendment to the California constitution allowing literacy in either
English or Spanish to suffice was proposed prior to the Castro decision.
See WEST'S CAL. CONST. ANN. proposed amendment, art. II, § 1. But, the
Castro decision did not limit political awareness to any particular language.
22. W sT's CAL. CoNsr. ANN. art II, § 1 reads in the applicable part
"[N]o person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English
language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an
elector in this state." Compare the South Carolina proposed amendment:
"The General Assembly may require each person to demonstrate a reasonable
ability . . . to read and write the English language as a condition to becoming
entitled to vote." R1352, 112127, April 29, 1970 (emphasis added).
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